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Abstract 
This paper investigates the manner in which private equity and venture capital firms in South 
Africa assess investment opportunities. The analysis was facilitated using a survey containing 
both Likert-scale and open-ended questions. The key findings show that both private equity 
and venture capital firms rate the entrepreneur or management team more highly above any 
other criterion or consideration. Private equity firms, however, also place emphasis on 
financial criteria more than venture capitalists. There is also an observable shift in the 
investment activities away from start-up funding and towards later-stage deals. Risk appetite 
has also declined post the financial crisis. 
JEL Classification: G24, G34, N27 
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1. Introduction 
Besides limited access to start-up capital as an inhibitor to entrepreneurship in South Africa, 
many other factors have come up in entrepreneurial surveys. In a survey by Herrington, Kew 
& Kew (2009), 81% of respondents cited shortage of capital as the biggest challenge in their 
businesses. However other challenges cited relate to business planning (68%), insufficient 
information knowledge (75%), quality of employees (57%), and issues around the marketing 
of products/services (57%). In this regard private equity (PE) becomes an important source of 
financing for such businesses. This is because PE firms do not just provide funding but also 
bring a wealth of experience, knowledge, expertise, networks, alliances and new customers to 
the businesses they fund. They provide capital to high-risk businesses that other capital 
providers would not otherwise fund. These include businesses without track records, rapidly 
growing businesses in constant need of external funding and distressed or troubled 
companies.  
Private equity broadly refers two forms of investments; venture capital (VC) and buyouts 
(Smolarski, 2007). While PE is commonly used to refer to the buyouts of later-stage 
businesses, VC provides seed or start-up capital to early-stage and high-growth businesses, 
mostly innovation-based.  
With the declining trend in PE and VC investments in South Africa from R26.1 billion in 
2007 to only R7.0 billion in 2009 (KPMG & SAVCA
1
, 2010), seed capital by venture 
capitalists has been the most affected. Deloitte & SAVCA (2009) reported that whereas 
approximately 40% of the respondents (VC investors) were interested in seed or start-up 
capital and early-stage investments in 2005, this figure had dropped to approximately 23% by 
2008 and to less than 5% by the third quarter of 2009. This is corroborated in a subsequent 
study by KPMG & SAVCA (2010) who reported that seed or start-up capital and early-stage 
investments declined from R1.134 billion in 2008 to only R280 million in 2009. Thus, seed 
capital is provided by friends and family with the so-called “angel investors” often filling the 
funding gap between friends and family and VC investors (Wainwright & Groeninger, 
2005)
2
. 
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Numerous authors have argued that the presence of an active PE and VC market encourages 
the efficient allocation of capital (Banerjee, 2008; Chan, 1983; Sahlman, 1988; Wright, 
Gilligan & Amess, 2009). PE directs capital flows to where they are most effective resulting 
in an optimal reward per given level of risk. However, given the general lack of transparency 
and the shortage of information flows in the industry, it is not clear if such efficient allocation 
does indeed take place. According to Hege, Palomino & Schwienbacher (2003) the higher 
internal rate of return (IRR) in the US than in Europe is due to the more advanced screening 
skills of US venture capital investors. It is in this arena of PE investment screening and 
decision-making that this research is concerned. With PE funds receiving hundreds of 
proposals by prospective business owners every day, knowing what they are looking for in 
such proposals is essential. This research tries to make a contribution here by evaluating the 
investment criteria used by PE and VC firms in South Africa in making their investment 
decisions. These and other questions will be addressed: 
1. What is it that South African PE and VC firms look for in an investment? Do they use 
the same investment criteria that are used by PE and VC firms elsewhere?  
2. Are investment criteria used by PE firms that focus on later-stage investments and 
buyouts significantly different from those used by VC firms that focus on early-stage 
deals and if so where do the differences lie?  
3. Considering the declining trend in PE and VC investments in South Africa between 
2007 and 2009 as reported in the KPMG & SAVCA (2010) report, have VC firms in 
South Africa tightened or revised their investment criteria post the financial crisis and 
if so what has changed? 
The study proceeds as follows. The literature review (Section 2) is presented in three parts. 
The first part describes the emergence of PE and VC markets and the typical manner in which 
they function. The second part reviews PE and VC activities in South Africa. The third part 
ends the section by describing investment screening and decision-making criteria on both 
South Africa and internationally as documented in the literature. These criteria are used in 
designing the Likert-scale questionnaire that is used in the data collection as described in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the research results and Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Review of related literature 
2.1 The functionality of private equity and venture capital markets 
Wright et al. (2009: 2) describe PE as “an increasingly important mechanism to rapidly and 
radically restructure organisations worldwide.” In this context, it is becoming ever more 
important that the PE market functions as well as possible so as to best provide alternative 
funding and encourage economic growth (Zider, 1998).  
In an attempt to determine how the success of the US venture capital market can be replicated 
in other countries, Gilson (2003: 1069) expounds on three factors that are crucial, namely, 
“capital, specialised financial intermediaries, and entrepreneurs.” Gilson (2003) explains that 
the availability of capital and the support of effective financial intermediaries will lead to the 
promotion and facilitation of entrepreneurial activity. This model, as described by Gilson 
(2003), offers a clear and succinct perspective of VC market development.  
Another useful model was first advanced by Tyebjee and Bruno (1984). This model has five 
distinct steps, that is, deal origination, screening, evaluation, deal structuring, and post 
investment activities. Whereas the screening phase in the Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) model is 
only a firm-specific screen, Fried and Hisrich (1994), in a subsequent article, suggested that 
there are in fact two screening phases, one firm-specific and the other generic. The screening 
phase in Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) only takes into account basic criteria such as deal size, 
geographical location and stage of financing. It does not take into account pre-evaluation 
factors such as the quality of the business plan or relevant proposal-specific knowledge held 
by the venture capitalists.  These are accounted for in the Fried and Hisrich (1994) version.  
A further difference in the Tyebjee and Bruno (1984) and Fried and Hisrich (1994) models is 
the inclusion of an additional evaluation phase by the later authors. This phase relates to the 
VC evaluation activity post the pricing settlement. In isolation, the VC process model has 
limited applicability. However, as a lens through which to understand VC activity, and by 
extension PE activity, it is useful for two reasons. Firstly, it provides a clear perspective of 
the investment process and allows one to contextualise how and when VC firms apply their 
investment decision criteria. Secondly, it is useful in understanding the VC cycle model 
created by Gompers and Lerner (2000) described as one of sustainable and self-renewing 
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growth.  It explains the development of a VC market as a product life cycle that begins with 
the raising of funds from investors, continues with the investment in companies, the 
monitoring of and value addition to these companies, and ends with the successful exit from 
the investment and the returning of capital to investors. The cycle then renews itself with the 
raising of new funds (Gompers & Lerner, 2000).  
A final consideration in the functionality of PE markets is the phenomenon of syndication, 
the process whereby two or more investment firms partake in an investment opportunity. 
Lockett & Wright (2001) suggested three rationales for syndication, that is, to share financial 
risk, to pool resources to specific target levels, and to boost deal flow through reciprocity 
with other PE firms. According to Hege et al. (2003), a mature market, such as the US, 
benefits considerably more from syndication than a younger market, such as in Europe. 
Consistent with the findings of Hege et al. (2003), Bent, Williams & Gilbert (2004) found 
that while syndicated investments appear to outperform stand-alone investments, only a 
relatively small proportion of around 13% of previous PE investments had been syndicated in 
South Africa, compared to an equivalent figure of 60% in the US. 
2.2 Private equity and venture capital in South Africa 
Previous studies have questioned the effectiveness of adapting the US VC model to other 
countries such as Brazil (de Lima Ribeiro & de Carvalho, 2008) and South Africa 
(Lingelbach, Murray & Gilbert, 2008). In their findings, Lingelbach et al. (2008) indicated 
that the traditional simultaneity and VC cycle models, proposed by Gilson (2003) and 
Gompers & Lerner (2000), respectively, are insufficient in explaining VC development in 
emerging economies such as South Africa. Lingelbach et al. (2008) proposed an alternative 
model which introduces the concept of coproduction
3
 as a third necessary process for the 
formulation of a successful VC market. This model was tested by Lingelbach & Gilbert 
(2009) in a study on Botswana.  
In South Africa, Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) is also a necessary and important 
driver of PE activity. According to Missankov, Van Dyk, Va Biljon, Hayes & Van der Veen 
(2006: 56), BEE dominates the South African PE industry and is promoted either through the 
ownership and management structure of PE managers or through the funding sources used for 
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the PE transactions. It is estimated that more than 90% of total PE transactions in South 
Africa and 100% of buyout transactions have a BEE element (Missankov et al., 2006: 56).  
With such an obvious state-induced influence over the PE industry in South Africa, it is, 
therefore, not surprising that Lingelbach et al. (2008) lay part of the blame for VC stagnation 
in the country on BEE.  It can thus be deduced that BEE acts as a catalyst in later-stage PE 
investments (Missankov et al., 2006), on one hand, and as an inhibitor in early-stage VC 
investments (Lingelbach et al., 2008) on the other. 
Another feature of the South African PE market is its skewness towards later-stage 
investment activity. Internationally, the PE industry has shown considerable growth over the 
last 10 years, and South Africa is no exception to this (van Niekerk & Krige, 2009). A 
significant component of this growth is, however, accounted for by the later-stage buyout end 
of the market (Wright et al., 2009). While markets such as the US and Asia (Pintado, De 
Lima & Van Auken, 2007) still maintain a strong focus on early-stage VC investments, other 
markets, such as Europe (Pintado et al., 2007), Brazil (de Lima Ribeiro & de Carvalho, 
2008), Australia (Hudson & Evans, 2005), and South Africa (Jones, 2009; Lingelbach et al., 
2008; Roodt, 2007; Stillman, Sunderland, Heyl & Swart, 1999) are investing more in later-
stage projects.  Given this, it seems incongruent that the majority of published literature has 
tended to focus on addressing issues relating to early-stage VC activity. The investment 
decision criteria so far documented relate more to VC firms that invest in early-stage projects 
than to PE.  
2.2.1 The South African Regulatory Environment for PE/VC Firms 
Like any other company, the establishment of PE and VC firms in South Africa is governed 
by the new Companies Act No. 71 of 2008 which came into effect on 1 May 2011, replacing 
the Companies Act No. 61 of 1973. The legal form of entreprise often taken by PE and VC 
firms is the en commandite partnership, which has two categories of partners – the general 
(disclosed) partners and the limited (undisclosed) partners. PE/VC firms can also take the 
„company‟ legal form. Under the Companies Act, the Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) 
overrides any shareholder agreements in case of contradictions. The only problematic legal 
structure, especially for pension funds as investors in PE/VC funds is a „trust‟. Unless it is a 
bewind trust whereby the trustees simply administer or control the invested assets, it may 
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mean transferring the ownership of the invested assets to the fund trustees. This is not 
allowed under Section 5 of the Pension Funds Act No. 24 of 1956. 
While Regulation 28 of the Pension Fund Act previously did not stipulate the allocation that 
pension funds can make to PE investments, the amended Regulation 28 which came into 
effect on 1 July 2011 limits investments by South African Pension Funds to 10% of their 
assets in PE funds, with a 2.5% limit per individual fund and a 5% limit to a fund of funds. 
This regulation also requires a pension fund, its advisors and trustees to perform reasonable 
due diligence in its investment and disinvestment activities by taking into account relevant 
risks – the solvency, liquidity and reasonableness test. Public-to-private buyout transactions, 
prevalent among PE firms, are regulated under the Companies Act of 2008, the Takeover 
Code, JSE Listing Requirements, the Securities Services Act of 2004 and the Competition 
Act of 1998 (Bellew, Hutton & Dennehy, 2011). In addition, PE fund managers and advisors 
are required to be licensed under the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) 
Act of 2003. 
The South African Income Tax Act of 1962, as amended, regulates the tax relief entitlement 
of headquarter companies that meet the Act‟s definition. With the partnership legal structure, 
PE fund partners are taxed in their personal capacities on their portion of interest attributed. 
Foreign partners are taxed only on income generated within the Republic and are required to 
pay capital gains tax on the proceeds from the disposal of their South African interests, assets 
and immovable property. They are also subject to exchange control approval by the Financial 
Surveillance Department (FSD) of the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) under the 
Exchange Control Regulatory Order Rules of 1961. 
The Taxation Laws Amendment Bill of 2011 provides for the taxation of restructuring, 
mergers and acquisitions and PE transactions, whether these are in the form of 
amalgamations (Section 44), intra-group (Section 45), or liquidations (Section 47). Interest on 
debt used to finance these transactions is no longer automatically deductible but is subject to 
approval by the South African Revenue Service (SARS) following application by the 
acquitting company as defined in Sections 45(1) or 47(1) of the Income Tax Act.
4
 Any 
interest that is considered excessive is treated as declared dividends under the thin 
capitalisation restrictions of the Income Tax Act. Investment by individuals in a SARS-
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approved VC company is tax deductible up to R750 000 per VC investment or R2.25 million 
aggregate lifetime limit.  
With the relaxation of Exchange controls, PE funds are no longer required to seek SARB 
approval on a deal-by-deal basis when investing outside the common monetary area of South 
Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Swaziland. They only need to acquire approval for all foreign 
investments, renewable every 3 years. In addition, amendments to the Tax laws have been 
instrumental in avoiding local taxation on international investors. Funds no longer need to 
have dual structures (local and foreign), thus eliminating unnecessary administrative and 
legal costs that comes with the dualism (Bellew et al., 2011). Foreign fund managers with 
deals on the continent can also set base in the country with ease if it is essential for them to 
do so (Bellew et al., 2011). Therefore, given this regulatory background, the question that 
remains is what else do PE/VC firms in South Africa consider in making their investment 
decisions. 
2.3 Evaluation criteria in private equity and venture capital 
Although Quindlen (2000: 169) describes the process of valuing an early-stage investment as 
“much more an art than a science”, the most common methods used by VC firms include the 
discounted cash flow (DCF) method, the earnings multiple approach, the net asset value 
(NAV) approach, and the subjective VC method (Ge, Mahoney & Mahoney, 2005). 
Manigart, Waele, Wright, Robbie, Debrieres, Sapienza & Beekman (2000) found that there 
are considerable differences in the valuation techniques used across the countries they 
studied. They attributed this primarily to differences in maturity levels of the markets. 
Smolarski (2007) asserts that differences “are not as large as previously and that the pre-
investment stage is relatively homogenous across countries.”  
While the above concerns relate to the valuation of new ventures undertaken by VC firms, 
similar concerns can be inferred for later-stage PE investments. Diller & Kaserer (2009: 648) 
state that when compared to the relatively efficient public exchanges, the lack of a continuous 
market for PE investments result in information asymmetries in the market. Of more 
importance in PE than in publicly traded funds are the management skills of the fund-holders 
(Wright & Robbie, 1998; Rogers, Holland & Haas, 2002; Diller & Kaserer, 2009).  
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This concept of information asymmetry further reiterates the importance of sound evaluation 
processes in PE investments. The first published studies on the subject of investment decision 
criteria were done by Tyebjee & Bruno (1984), MacMillan, Siegel & Subba Narasimha 
(1985), and MacMillan, Zemann & Subba Narasimha (1987), and each of these sought to 
provide useful rankings of the relative importance of various investment criteria. 
Interestingly, the results of these studies generally point to the importance of the entrepreneur 
or management team when evaluating new projects. Pointing out similar research done in the 
mid-1990s by Fried and Hisrich (1994), Wright and Robbie (1998) suggested that concern 
has shifted towards market acceptance of the product. This possibly indicates the developing 
sophistication of the US VC market at the time.  
Findings in the US (Kakati, 2003) and contemporary research, albeit in a European VC 
context, for example Spain (Pintado et al., 2007) and Central and Eastern Europe (Farag, 
Hommel, Witt & Wright, 2004), and in South African (van Deventer & Mlambo, 2009), 
support the assertion that the entrepreneur and/or management team are an important decision 
criterion. According to Pintado et al. (2007, p. 85) the, “characteristics of the entrepreneur, 
manager background, and management team experience were consistently more important 
evaluation criteria than market and product characteristics.” Sander and Koomagi (2007) add 
further contemporary support, in their study of Estonian PE and VC firms, by indicating that 
non-financial criteria, in general, and the strengths of the management team, in particular, 
play an important role in the evaluation process.  
Clearly there appears to be considerable consensus on the topic of the importance of 
management or entrepreneur-related criteria when evaluating new investments. However, one 
needs to look at a whole array of factors that influence the performance of new ventures since 
limiting the number of criteria in survey questionnaires may result in important 
characteristics of the process being overlooked (Kakati, 2003). In this respect, van Deventer 
& Mlambo (2009) incorporated 54 possible decision criteria in their questionnaire. 
Wright & Robbie (1998) criticise the fact that the majority of the relevant literature relates to 
investment criteria employed by early-stage VC firms, with little attention given to 
differences in evaluation criteria according to investee growth stage. This is a view supported 
by Shepherd (1999: 629) who acknowledges the, “potential differences in a VC‟s decision 
policy for businesses in different stages of development.” While the above authors realised 
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the need for such research in the late 1990s, there is in fact still very little written about the 
effects of the investment stage on the decision criteria used, except a few attempts by Farag et 
al. (2004) and Pintado et al. (2007). These two studies focused on developed countries. 
However, it is expected that the criteria differ not only according to investee growth stage, 
but also between developed and emerging markets. This study tries to close this gap by 
investigating the investment decision criteria employed by early-stage VC versus later-stage 
PE firms in an emerging market context, namely, South Africa. 
3. Data and methods 
A sample of South African PE and VC firms was surveyed using criteria identified by van 
Deventer & Mlambo (2009). A statistical analysis was then conducted to allow the 
comparison of results to those achieved by van Deventer & Mlambo (2009). Including both 
PE and VC firms in the sample also enabled comparison of the two fund types. Open-ended 
questions regarding respondents‟ perceptions around changing firm and industry-specific 
conditions post the international financial crisis were added to the survey instrument. This 
facilitates a descriptive analysis to substantiate the findings of the criteria ranking analysis.  
For sampling purposes, the population was defined as all VC and PE firms that are listed as 
members of SAVCA. This list was considered to be sufficiently representative of the PE and 
VC firms in South Africa. This population was refined by eliminating non-relevant firm types 
such as law, advisory and consulting firms leaving 56 firms in total. Of the 56 firms, 41 are 
active in the PE space, 12 in VC, and 3 firms are active in both. A self-completion survey, 
developed by van Deventer & Mlambo (2009) with only minor modifications, was sent 
electronically to all the 56 firms and 26 responded, which translate to a 46% response rate. Of 
the 26 firms that responded, 15 are PE firms, 10 are VC firms and one is holding company 
active in both VC and PE. Using van Deventer & Mlambo (2009)‟s survey instrument was 
necessary to enable the comparison of VC investment criteria pre- and post- the global 
financial crisis.
5
  
The original questionnaire consisted of Likert-scale questions, determined through a literature 
analysis of criteria used by overseas venture capitalists. In extending the survey to PE firms, a 
few questions were slightly reworded, in line with the language commonly used in PE circles. 
The re-wording mostly involved replacing the term “entrepreneur” with “management” in the 
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PE survey instrument. The questions were constructed so that respondents will rate the 
investment decision criteria in order of importance on a scale of 1 (not important), to 5 (very 
important). The research is limited by the low response rate of only 46%, thus small sample 
size, and the tendency of the Likert-scale method to oversimplify peoples‟ responses (Leedy 
& Ormrod, 2010).   
Although a high response rate is preferable, it is not uncommon in economic surveys to have 
a low response rate. Out of 249 managers and entrepreneurs, Gratchev and Bobina (2001) 
received 64 responses, translating to a response rate of 26%, while Brau and Fawcett (2006)‟s 
response rate was only 19%. One of the lowest response rates is by Bernile, Cumming and 
Lyandres (2007) who received responses from 42 funds out of 8000 funds, translating to a 
response rate of 0.5%. However, in these studies, even though the response rates were low, 
they reached the „more than 30‟ observations rule of thumb for statistical analysis. In South 
Africa, the population of PE and VC funds is low, such that a low response rate impacts on 
the choice statistical and econometrics analysis that can be done. In addition, one can only 
generalise results with a grain of salt. 
While having one respondent per firm may result in responses not reflective of the view of 
the whole firm‟s executive team, it is important to note that the effect is minimal since PE 
and VC firms typically have small executive teams. In addition, to avoid the order effect bias 
that normally comes with the use of questionnaires, the questions were ordered randomly 
within each category. The order effect bias is whereby the “relative position of an item in an 
inventory of questions or stimuli may uniquely influence the way in which a respondent 
reacts to the item” (Perreault, 1975: 544). 
4. Research analysis and findings 
4.1 Analysis of group or category rankings 
A nonparametric, Friedman two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was used to 
determine if there are any significant differences in the rankings of the four categories of 
criteria, namely, management, product, financial, and market considerations as ranked by PE 
firms and by VC firms. The test results are reported at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels of 
significance in Table 1.  
11 
 
Significant differences in the rankings of the four categories by both PE firms and VC firms 
are observed. In the case of PE firms, the observed Friedman statistic of 17.325 is significant 
at the 1% level, suggesting that at least two of the four categories differ. The management 
considerations category has the highest mean rank of 3.375 (as shown in Table 1), implying 
that it is the most important of the four categories. In the survey, 63% of PE firms ranked 
management considerations as the top most important criteria group, compared to 25% for 
the financial considerations, 13% for product considerations and 0% for marketing 
considerations.  
Regarding VC firms, it is observed that while no significant differences exist in the rankings 
of the four categories at the 5% level of significance, they are found to exist at the 10% level 
of significance with a reported Friedman test statistic of 7.737. The mean ranking of 
management considerations was also found to be the highest of the four categories with a 
mean rank of 3.2. Whereas the lowest mean ranking for PE firms is observed for market 
considerations with a mean rank of 1.5, the lowest mean rank for VC firms is observed for 
the financial considerations category with a mean rank of 1.8.  
Looking at the Kendall coefficients of concordance and the average rank correlation 
coefficient, it also appears that there is a relatively higher level of agreement in the rankings 
of the four categories by PE firms than by VC firms. 
Table 1: Friedman and Mann-Whitney U test results: private equity and venture capital firms 2010 
Variable Friedman test  Mann-Whitney U Test 
private equity venture capital private equity  vs. venture capital  
Mean 
Rank 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Rank 
Std. 
Dev. Adjusted Z Statistic p-value 
Management Considerations 3.375 0.957 3.200 1.101 0.649 0.516 
Product Consideration 2.438 0.892 2.850 0.823 -0.870 0.384 
Financial Considerations 2.688 1.138 1.800 0.789 2.006** 0.045 
Market Considerations 1.500 0.632 2.150 1.101 -1.377 0.168 
Friedman ANOVA Chi Sqr. 17.325*** 7.737* 
  P-value 0.001 0.052 
   Kendall Coeff. of Concordance 0.361 0.258 
   Aver. rank r 0.318 0.175 
  Source: Analysis of survey data done using STATISTICA 
*** Implies significance at the 1% level, ** Implies significance at the 5% level,   * Implies significance at the 10% level , 
Std. Dev. = standard deviation 
In order to undertake a direct comparison of the results of the PE and VC surveys as they 
pertain to the four respective categories, a pairwise comparison using the Mann-Whitney U 
test was carried out. Whereas no statistically significant differences are observed between PE 
and VC firms in their rankings of management, product and market considerations, 
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significant differences are observed in the way the two fund types rank financial 
considerations. A Mann-Whitney z-statistic of 2.006 is observed for financial considerations, 
implying a statistical significance at the 5% level. This suggests that there are differences in 
the manner in which PE and VC firms assess financial considerations, a finding that is also 
observed in the responses to the open-ended questions.  
Further to this, the Sign Test was employed to determine the significance of the differences in 
the mean rankings between the most important and the least important criteria groups, that is 
between management and market considerations for PE firms and between management and 
financial considerations for VC firms. However, in both cases, results are reported for both 
management versus market considerations and management versus financial considerations. 
The results, as given in Table 2, suggest that South African PE firms recognise management 
considerations to be more important than market considerations, and this result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level of significance with a Sign test z-statistic of 3.25. With VC firms, 
on the other hand, management considerations are found to be significantly more important 
than financial considerations and this result is observed at the 5% level of significance  with a 
z-statistic of 2.214 (Table 2).   
Table 2: Sign test results: private equity and venture capital firms 2010 
Pair of Variables Private Equity Venture Capital 
Sign Test Z Stat. p-value Sign Test Z Stat. p-value 
Management Considerations & Market Considerations 3.250*** 0.001 0.949 0.343 
Management Considerations & Financial Considerations 1.250 0.211 2.214** 0.027 
Source: Analysis of survey data done using STATISTICA 
*** Implies significance at the 1% level   ** Implies significance at the 5% level   * Implies significance at the 10% level 
These findings are consistent with the literature where, among others, Sander and Koomagi, 
(2007) and Wright and Robbie (1998) point out the inherent difficulties in valuing start-up 
enterprises. Writing within this context of low valuation accuracy of start-ups, Farag et al. 
(2004), Ge et al. (2005), Hege et al. (2003), Hill & Power (2001), Kakati (2003), and Mishra 
(2004) have found that, in response to the valuation difficulty, VC firms tend to look more 
closely at management considerations. Indeed Muzyka, Birley & Leleux (1996) found that 
venture capitalists, when tested on the trade-offs made in assessing new ventures, tend to 
favour opportunities that display management fundamentals even if the deal does not meet 
overall fund requirements. In the responses to the open-ended questions, a number of the 
respondents indicated a general lack of willingness among PE firms to fund start-ups due to 
the high levels of uncertainty involved. 
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The fact that no significant differences are observed between management and market 
considerations, as ranked by VC firms, is in contrast to the results reported by van Deventer 
& Mlambo (2009). This anomaly would appear to have two possible explanations. Firstly, it 
may indicate a change in the functionality of South African VC firms since the survey by van 
Deventer and Mlambo (2009) was conducted in 2007 in that some venture capitalists may 
now be operating in the PE space. Secondly, it might perhaps signify the maturation of the 
South African VC market, in line with the findings by Fried & Hisrich (1994) on the US 
market. It is also important to note that two of the firms categorised as VC firms in van 
Deventer & Mlambo (2009) were categorised as PE firms in this study as they attested to the 
fact that since 2007 their activities have shifted away from typical early-stage VC 
investments towards later-stage PE investments.  
4.2 Investment criteria rankings by private equity versus venture capital firms 
To enable comparison with the van Deventer & Mlambo (2009) study, an examination of the 
most important and least important criteria is carried out and the mean rankings and standard 
deviations for the top ten and bottom ten criteria reported in Tables 3 and 4, respectively
6
. 
Respondents were also given the opportunity to list and rate the importance of any additional 
criteria that were not mentioned in the questionnaire but which they felt should have been 
included. These additional criteria and their rankings are presented separately in Appendix 
Table A1.  
4.2.1 Ten most important criteria as ranked by private equity versus venture capital firms 
The data (Table 3) indicate a strong bias towards management criteria, especially for PE 
firms, with five of the top ten criteria falling into this category, compared to one for market 
and one for financial considerations. With VC firms, although four of the top ten criteria are 
product considerations, the top three criteria all relate to management considerations and 
none of the criteria in the top ten relate to financial considerations. For both PE firms and VC 
firms, the honesty and integrity of the management team or entrepreneur top the list as the 
highest rated criterion. This finding is consistent with other findings by MacMillan et al. 
(1985), Fried & Hisrich (1994) and Pintado et al. (2007). MacMillan et al. (1985), for 
example, reported in their findings that five of the top 10 most important criteria had 
something to do with the entrepreneur‟s experience or personality.  
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A further interesting observation is that while a high IRR is ranked as the fourth most 
important criterion by PE firms with a mean rank of 4.6 and a low standard deviation of 0.51, 
a high IRR does not appear in the top ten most important criteria for VC firms
7
. This further 
asserts the view that later-stage investments are easier to value than early-stage investments. 
While Wright and Robbie (1998: 526) seem to suggest that there is less focus on financial 
criteria at the early-stage, the findings by Pintado et al. (2007: 86) appear to be contrary. In 
their examination of the Spanish VC market they found evaluation factors affecting the 
required rate of return to be ranked as generally more important for early-stage than for late-
stage deals.  
Table 3: Ten most important criteria as ranked by private equity firms vs. venture capital firms 2010 
Top 10 Criteria as Ranked by private equity Firms Top 10 Criteria as Ranked by venture capital Firms 
Criterion Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Catego
ry* Criterion Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Category
* 
The management team is 
honest and has integrity 4.73 0.59 Mgt 
The entrepreneur is honest 
and has integrity 4.82 0.42 Mgt 
The management team has 
excellent skills/experience 4.73 0.46 Mgt 
The entrepreneur has good 
knowledge of the sector 4.82 0.42 Mgt 
The product or service has 
a good market acceptance 4.60 0.51 Pdt 
The entrepreneur has a great 
desire for success 4.80 0.42 Mgt 
The investment will 
provide a high internal rate 
of return (IRR) 
4.60 0.51 Fin 
The size of the market (Big 
market for the 
product/service) 
4.79 0.42 Mkt 
The management team has 
a good track record 4.53 0.64 Mgt 
The product/service has a 
competitive advantage over 
competing products 
4.75 0.48 Pdt 
The management team has 
a great desire for success 4.53 0.74 Mgt 
The product/service is 
unique and/or patentable 4.64 0.52 Pdt 
The management team has 
good knowledge of the 
sector 
4.47 0.64 Mgt There is a market need for 
the product or service 
4.59 0.52 Mkt 
The product/service has a 
competitive advantage over 
competing products 
4.47 0.64 Pdt There is potential for market growth 4.57 0.52 Mkt 
The investment has a 
developed product 
4.47 0.64 Pdt 
A good market acceptance 
for the product or service is 
expected 
4.54 0.53 Pdt 
There is potential for 
market growth 4.47 0.64 Mkt 
The venture has a developed 
product or working 
prototype 
4.53 0.71 Pdt 
Source: Own calculations from survey responses 
* Key to columns 4 and 8: Abbreviation notation used to conserve space. Mgt = Management; Pdt = Product; Mkt = 
Marketing; Fin = Financial; and “Other” refer to any other category apart from the first four. 
 
4.2.2 Ten least important criteria as ranked by private equity and venture capital firms 
The ten least important criteria as ranked by the PE and VC firms are detailed in Table 4. 
While the results are generally similar for both firm types, for PE firms, five of the ten least 
important criteria relate to financial considerations, compared to four for VC firms. For both 
PE and VC firms, two of the ten least important criteria each relate to market and product 
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considerations, and one is a general criterion relating to the BEE status of the prospective 
business. Interestingly, in line with the findings thus far, and in line with the majority of 
available literature, none of the management criteria for PE firms, and only one for VC firms, 
appear in the ten least important criteria list.  The least important criterion as ranked by PE 
respondents is whether the product or service in question makes use of an emerging or 
innovative technology. This criterion scored a mean rank of 2.0, compared to 3.8 obtained 
from the VC rankings.  
Conversely, in the case of VC firms, the least important criterion is the venture‟s BEE status 
with a mean rank of 1.88. This supports the assertion by Lingelbach et al. (2008) that BEE is 
in fact an inhibitor of early-stage VC activity in South Africa. Contrary to the supposition by 
Missankov et al. (2006) and van Niekerk & Krige (2009) that BEE acts as a significant 
incentive in the PE space, the “BEE status” criterion in this study is ranked as the fourth least 
important criterion by PE firms with a low mean rank of 2.4, and as the least important by 
VC firms as aforementioned.  
Table 4: Ten least important criteria as ranked by private equity firms vs. venture capital firms 2010 
Bottom 10 Criteria as Ranked by PE Firms Bottom 10 Criteria as Ranked by venture capital Firms 
Criterion Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Category Criterion Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Category 
The product/service make 
use of an emerging or 
innovative technology 
2.00 0.85 Pdt The venture has BEE status 1.88 0.88 Other 
There will be a tax benefit 
in financing the 
investment 
2.33 0.72 Fin 
The venture will require low 
monitoring and administration 
costs 
2.18 0.79 Fin 
The business will create a 
new market 
2.33 0.82 Mkt The venture has production 
capabilities in place 
2.29 0.82 Pdt 
The business has BEE 
status 
2.40 0.99 Other The venture will operate in a 
non-competitive industry 
2.32 0.67 Mkt 
There will be no follow up 
investment required 
2.47 1.19 Fin There will be a tax benefit in 
financing the venture 
2.39 1.07 Fin 
The investment will 
require low marketing and 
production costs 
2.47 0.99 Fin 
The venture will require low 
marketing and production 
costs 
2.42 0.70 Fin 
The investment will 
require low monitoring 
and administration costs 
2.53 0.92 Fin Product/service is in an early-stage of life cycle 2.52 0.85 Pdt 
There should be an early 
exit opportunity 2.67 1.18 Fin 
There will be no follow up 
investment required 2.68 1.06 Fin 
There are no high barriers 
to new entrants in this 
market 
2.80 1.61 Mkt The entrepreneur has many 
years of work experience 
2.80 0.42 Mgt 
The product/service is 
unique and/or patentable 2.93 1.22 Pdt 
There are no high barriers to 
new entrants in this market 3.00 0.82 Mkt 
Source: Own calculations from survey responses 
* Key to columns 4 and 8: Mgt = Management; Pdt = Product; Mkt = Marketing; Fin = Financial; and “Other” refer to any 
other category apart from these four. 
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The importance of high barriers to entry in the market for PE firms was the most polarising 
with a standard deviation of 1.61. Although it achieved the ninth lowest mean rank of 2.8, 
two of the respondents opted to include it as an additional important criterion in the survey. 
Shepherd (1999) highlights the importance of high barriers in providing a new venture with a 
period of monopoly as a first entrant. As such high barriers can be considered more important 
for early-stage VC investments. In this study, high barriers to entry appear as the tenth least 
important criterion for VC firms, although it achieved a higher average rank of 3.04, 
compared to 2.8 for PE firms. The very high standard deviation for this criterion, in the case 
of the PE survey results, is likely to have occurred due to the fact that certain of the firms‟ 
investment activities cover a wide spectrum of opportunities from early-stage to later-stage 
investments and as such a high degree of variance is likely to be observed in the importance 
placed on competitive barriers. 
4.3 Criteria rankings by venture capitalists: 2010 vs. 2007 surveys 
In a similar study, van Deventer & Mlambo (2009) report results from a survey of 12 VC 
firms conducted in 2007. The mean rankings from this 2007 survey, as reported in van 
Deventer & Mlambo (2009), are compared with mean rankings by VC firms in the 2010 
survey. The most important and least important criteria from the two surveys are reported in 
Tables 5 and 6, respectively.  
4.3.1 The most important criteria as ranked by venture capitalists: 2010 vs. 2007 
Although in 2007, a high IRR was considered jointly with the entrepreneur‟s honesty and 
integrity and a good market acceptance for the product or service, to be one of the most 
important criteria with a mean rank of 4.91, its importance in the 2010 survey has dropped 
significantly to an average rank of 4.02. Other criteria that have shown significant changes in 
ranking include the existence of an opportunity for an early exit, the merger or acquisition 
potential of the venture, the uniqueness and/or patentability of the product or service, how 
articulate the entrepreneur is about the venture, and the presence of a developed product or 
working prototype for the venture. These criteria have significantly increased in importance 
with the mean rankings improving by 1.10, 0.87, 0.82, 0.79 and 0.62 points, respectively. The 
first two criteria are closely related and they each have something to do with the efficient 
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capitalisation of the investment. Their increased importance can in part be explained by the 
shift in focus by VC firms from early-stage towards later-stage investments since 2007.  
Respondents to the open-ended questions indicated a general move away from investing in 
start-up ventures, where the opportunity for numerous rounds of financing is important
8
, 
towards more mature later-stage deals, where the ability to efficiently and profitably exit an 
investment is critical. This may well be in response to the recent financial crisis and the 
increased risk aversion by the VC firms that followed. Firms that took on too much risk are 
the ones that suffered the most during the financial crisis. Indeed, three of the VC firms that 
responded to the open-ended questions indicated that they have shifted focus to later-stage 
deals due to increased uncertainty. Another respondent pointed out that exit opportunities 
have become more difficult in a post-financial crisis environment. The full responses to the 
open-ended questions are reported in Appendix Table A3 for PE funds and Appendix Table 
A4 for VC funds.  
Table 5: Most important criteria as ranked by venture capital firms: 2010 vs. 2007 mean ranks 
Criterion 2010 Mean 2007 Mean Difference 
The entrepreneur is honest and has integrity 4.82 4.91 -0.09 
The entrepreneur has good knowledge of the sector 4.82 4.18 0.64 
The entrepreneur has a great desire for success 4.80 4.73 0.07 
The size of the market (There is a big market for the product or service) 4.79 4.45 0.34 
The product/service has a competitive advantage over competing products 4.75 4.73 0.02 
The product/service is unique and/or patentable 4.64 3.82 0.82 
There is a market need for the product or service 4.59 4.82 -0.23 
There is potential for market growth 4.57 4.73 -0.16 
A good market acceptance for the product or service is expected 4.54 4.91 -0.37 
The venture has a developed product or working prototype 4.53 3.91 0.62 
The entrepreneur has excellent management skills/experience 4.45 4.55 -0.10 
The entrepreneur is articulate about the venture 4.43 3.64 0.79 
The entrepreneur is hardworking and flexible 4.32 4.55 -0.23 
The entrepreneur has good leadership ability 4.31 4.45 -0.14 
The managers must be realistic 4.29 3.82 0.47 
The entrepreneur has a good track record 4.24 4.27 -0.03 
The venture has merger/acquisition potential 4.23 3.36 0.87 
The references of the entrepreneur are reputable 4.14 4.09 0.05 
There should be an early exit opportunity 4.10 3.00 1.10 
The entrepreneur is capable of intense, sustained effort 4.04 4.18 -0.14 
The venture will provide a high internal rate of return (IRR) 4.02 4.91 -0.89 
Source: Own calculations from survey responses. The criteria are presented in the table using the 2010 survey rankings 
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4.3.2 The least important criteria as ranked by venture capitalists: 2010 vs. 2007 
With regards to the least important criteria, the data reveals that apart from the importance of 
the criterion “no follow up investment required”, the presence of a tax benefit in financing a 
venture has also improved in importance from a mean ranking of 1.91 in 2007 to 2.39 in 
2010, albeit with a higher standard deviation, increasing from 0.70 to 1.07. With the current 
lack of deal flows, it may be that VC fund managers have become more creative in their 
investment decision motivations including exploiting the tax benefits of certain investment 
opportunities. This argument, however, is contrary to Tyebjee & Bruno‟s (1984) finding that 
most venture capitalists focus their efforts on capital gains for their investors rather than act 
on the tax shield. In addition, no explanation for this item was provided in the open-ended 
questions. 
Another interesting change is the decreased importance attached to the venture‟s BEE status, 
with a decline in mean ranking from 2.36 to 1.88. Since many, if not all, BEE deals are 
leveraged buyouts, and thus highly geared, the sharp decline in leveraged transactions post 
the financial crisis must have made these deals less prominent.  
Table 6 : Least important criteria as ranked by venture capital firms: 2010 vs. 2007 mean ranks 
Criterion 
2010 
Mean 
2007 
Mean 
Difference 
The venture has BEE status 1.88 2.36 -0.48 
The venture will require low monitoring and administration costs 2.18 2.09 0.09 
The venture has production capabilities in place 2.29 2.82 -0.53 
The venture will operate in a non-competitive industry 2.32 2.45 -0.13 
There will be a tax benefit in financing the venture 2.39 1.91 0.48 
The venture will require low marketing and production costs 2.42 2.64 -0.22 
Product/service is in an early-stage of life cycle 2.52 2.72 -0.20 
There will be no follow up investment required 2.68 2.09 0.59 
The entrepreneur has many years of work experience 2.80 3.09 -0.29 
Source: Own calculations from survey responses. The criteria are presented in the table using the 2010 survey rankings 
4.4 Statistical significance of differences in the responses  
In order to test the statistical significances of the differences in the decision criteria rankings 
between PE and VC firms and between the VC firms in the 2007 and in the 2010 surveys, t-
tests for matched pairs were performed on the mean rankings of the 54 criteria used. For the 
PE versus VC comparisons, a t-statistic of -1.455 was observed indicating no statistically 
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significant differences in the rankings by the two firm types, even at the 10% level of 
significance. This could be due to the closing gap between PE and VC in South Africa with 
investments becoming more concentrated on firms in the expansion and development phases. 
Farag et al. (2004), Pintado et al. (2007), Shepherd (1999), and Wright & Robbie (1998) have 
attempted to test the differences between the two ends of the PE spectrum, that is, the early-
stage and late-stage funds, but not between their investment criteria rankings.  
Table 7: t-tests – private equity vs. venture capital firms 2010, and venture capitalists 2010 vs. 2007 
Pairs of comparison Obs.
a
 Mean Diff. Std. Dev. Diff. t-stat
b
 df 
c
 P-value 
PE 2010 vs. VC 2010 54 -0.132 0.667 -1.455 53 0.152 
VC 2010 vs. VC 2007 54 -0.021 0.459 -0.340 53 0.735 
Source: Analysis of survey data using STATISTICA. 
a 
Obs. = observations. There were 54 items that were ranked in the questionnaire thus corresponding to 54 observations. Note that the values 
used for each firm type are the mean ranks as opposed to the raw data. 
b 
t-stat = t-statistics. The t-test used is for dependent samples 
c 
df = degrees of freedom.  
Similarly, the comparison between the mean rankings in the 2010 and 2007 VC surveys 
yielded no significant differences. A t-statistics of -0.340 was observed, which is not 
significant at any of the three significance levels. Therefore, while there is a shift in the 
ranking of categories and certain selected criteria, the general ranking of criteria has not 
changed. 
In order to assess ranking consistence and to deduce any changes, the responses by five VC 
representatives who completed both the 2007 and 2010 surveys were analysed and any 
differences assessed using the Sign test. The results are presented in Table 8. 
Table 8: Criteria rankings by the same venture capital: 2010 vs. 2007 
Pair of Variables No. of Non-ties Percent v < V Sign test Z stat. p-value 
Respondent A 2007 &   Respondent A 2010 31 22.581 2.874*** 0.004 
Respondent B 2007 &   Respondent B 2010 36 50.000 -0.167 0.868 
Respondent C 2007 &   Respondent C 2010 21 57.143 0.436 0.663 
Respondent D 2007 &   Respondent D 2010 29 51.724 0.000 1.000 
Respondent E 2007 &   Respondent E 2010 36 30.556 2.167** 0.030 
*** Implies significance at the 1% level;  ** Implies significance at the 5% level;  * Implies significance at the 10% level 
In Table 8, it can be seen that there were no significant changes in the rankings by three of 
the five respondents. The only significant differences were observed for respondents A and E. 
When looking at the actual rankings given by Respondents A and E in 2007 vis-a-vis 2010, 
both respondents revised their ranking of financial criteria downwards attaching them lower 
importance. This could be reflective of the post-financial crisis environment where greater 
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levels of uncertainty have resulted in a diminished emphasis on valuation tools, something 
that is substantiated by Respondent A‟s answers to the open-ended questions. According to 
respondent A, there is now greater skepticism of projections and forecasts in the face of 
uncertainty. 
The other downward revisions in the rankings by the two respondents were with respect to 
market considerations. Respondent E changed the ranking of “high barriers to entry for 
competitors” from a five (very important) in 2007 to a one (not important) in 2010 and “the 
length of the venture‟s lead time over competitors” from a four in 2007 to a one in 2010. 
Because these criteria are expected to be important in early-stage deals, this may confirm the 
assertion that there is a shift in South Africa from early-stage VC deals to later-stage PE 
investments. 
In general, improved criteria rankings of more than two points by all five respondents 
pertains to the negative effects of uncertainty. These include the proposed venture‟s 
resistance to economic cycles and whether it operates in a non-competitive industry and 
already has a working prototype. A number of the respondents asserted that an increasing 
amount of caution is now evident in the face of greater uncertainty. 
4.5 Risk and return 
In order to understand the importance that PE and VC firms place on return projections in 
evaluating projects for investment, four questions were included in the questionnaire, 
specifically on returns and valuations. Looking at the mean ranks of these four criteria (Table 
9), it is interesting to observe that although returns and valuations are still considered 
important by both PE and VC firms in their investment decision-making (with mean ranks 
above 3), they are not as important as they were in 2007. In 2007, the mean ranks for VCs for 
the same four criteria were all above 4, with the highest for IRR of 4.91.  
In order to determine if the differences are significant, a comparison test was done using the 
Mann-Whitney test. There are no statistically significant differences in the rankings of these 
four criteria by PE and VC firms in 2010. However, there are statistically significant 
differences at the 5% level in the ranking of two of the criteria by VC firms in 2010 vis-à-vis 
2007. Less importance is attached to high valuation projections and high IRR in 2010 
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compared to 2007, with Mann-Whitney z-statistics for the two criteria of -2.547 and -2.080, 
respectively. 
Table 9: The importance attached to financial criteria that focus on return and valuations 
Decision Criterion 
Mean ranks PE 2010 vs. VC 2010 VC 2010 vs. VC 2007 
PE 
2010 
VC 
2010 
VC 
2007 
Mann-W 
Z 
p-value 
Mann-W 
Z 
p-value 
High profit margin projections 3.63 3.80 4.27 -0.473 0.636 -1.041 0.298 
High valuation projections 3.56 3.90 4.73 -1.114 0.265 -2.457 0.014 
High internal rate of return (IRR) 4.50 4.00 4.91 0.759 0.448 -2.080 0.038 
High absolute return - (Large investment 
with sufficient monetary returns) 
4.31 3.70 4.18 1.698 0.089 -1.483 0.138 
Mann-Whitney analysis done using STATISTICA software 
No explicit risk-specific criteria were included in the survey for ranking. However, two PE 
respondents added criteria on risk but under the management category (see Appendix Table 
A1). In both cases, it seems they attach high importance to a manager who is not afraid to 
take risk, presumably implying high returns. In the open-ended questions, nonetheless, the 
indication is that risk appetite has generally declined post the financial crisis. In addition, the 
fact that firms with good managers survived the financial crisis, and not necessarily those that 
had promised high returns, may explain why high importance is now attached mostly to 
management criteria than to financial criteria.  
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
It is documented in the literature, internationally, that PE/VC is an important and growing 
contributor to economic growth. VC deals, although difficult to quantify, have become an 
increasingly important source of start-up funding (KPMG & SAVCA, 2008 & 2010; and 
Herrington et al., 2010). Thus the declining trend of PE/VC investments in South Africa 
should be a cause for concern. Research on PE/VC especially in the South African context is 
distinctly lacking.  
This study sets out to investigate the key criteria employed by PE and VC firms in evaluating 
new investment opportunities, and how these criteria differ between the two firm or fund 
types. It also examined how the investment criteria used by VC firms have shifted in 
importance since 2007 and how the PE/VC industry, in general, has changed in South Africa, 
in response to the recent global financial crisis. Data was gathered by means of an industry 
survey of PE and VC firms. The survey consisted predominantly of a Likert-scale 
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questionnaire, to allow for the ranking of criteria, as well as a number of open-ended 
questions that enabled respondents to provide qualitative information to substantiate their 
rankings. The survey results for 2007 were requested and obtained from van Deventer & 
Mlambo (2009). This enabled the analysis of any possible shifts in the rankings by VC firms. 
It is found that criteria relating to the quality of management or the entrepreneur are the most 
important, from both the PE and VC perspective, and in line with previous findings 
elsewhere. Differences in rankings by the PE and VC firms relate to criteria such as the 
importance of BEE status and the relevance of the IRR performance measure – a financial 
criterion. While no statistically significant differences are observed between PE and VC firms 
using the t-test, there are significant differences in the rankings of financial considerations by 
the two fund types. PE firms are evidently more concerned with financial considerations than 
their VC counterparts.  
With regards to the rankings of criteria by the VC firms in 2007 compared to 2010, no 
significant differences are observed. A pairwise comparison of the rankings by the five repeat 
VC survey participants indicates a shift in certain rankings, with significant differences for 
two out of the five participants. A closer look at the results indicates a decreased emphasis on 
financial criteria and a greater emphasis on risk aversion. In addition, there is an increased 
emphasis on criteria relating to the venture‟s merger and/or acquisition potential and the 
opportunity for early exit, indicating a bias towards late stage PE investments. 
5.1 Limitations and delimitations of the Study 
The study only reports the importance of criteria as reported by respondents. However, what 
is reported may not necessarily be what is implemented in practice. Therefore, our results 
suffer from self-reporting bias. An accurate assessment is only possible by analysing the 
proposals that have been presented to PE and VC firms and grouping those that have been 
funded and those that have been rejected and through a comparative analysis determine why a 
project would be funded and why it would be rejected. Unfortunately, there is no database for 
such proposals to enable this kind of analysis. In addition, due to the small sample size, 
generalising the results to South Africa could be a problem. 
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5.2 Future Study 
There is need to further study the changing nature of the PE/VC industry with respect to the 
allocation of funds between early-stage and later-stage deals. Given the importance of early-
stage or start-up funding in enterprise development and economic growth, the observed shift 
in investment activities by VC funds towards late-stage deals in South Africa is a cause for 
concern and warrants further investigation. The case for the development of South Africa‟s 
emerging (or stagnating) VC market needs to be contextualized accordingly so that 
appropriate policy solutions can be identified. In addition, the decreasing importance placed 
on financial valuation tools by both PE and VC firms, and the wider impact of the recent 
financial crisis on the industry need to be explored. Research should also focus on developing 
theory that can be used to understand the industry better, now and in the future.  
Acknowledgements 
The development of this work for publication was supported funding from the National 
Research Foundation (NRF). Any opinion, findings and conclusions or recommendations 
expressed in this material are those of the authors and not of the NRF. The NRF accept no 
liability in this regard thereto. We also acknowledge the useful comments from two 
anonymous referees. Any errors and omissions remain ours. 
24 
 
Endnotes 
                                               
1 South African Venture Capital & Private Equity Association 
2 http://www.money-zine.com/Investing/Investing/Angel-Investors/. http://sbinfocanada.about.com/cs/financing/g/angel.htm. 
http://www.noobpreneur.com/2012/08/17/where-to-look-for-angel-investors/; etc 
3 This is a “distributed-production arrangement in which different firms (often located in different countries) produce 
different parts of the same end product. It may involve the transfer of technology as well as of key personnel, especially in 
the early-stages of the agreement.” (http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/coproduction.html). 
4 http://www.bowman.co.za/News-Blog/Blog/PrivateEquity-Significant-Regulatory-Developments 
5 Van Deventer and Mlambo did their survey in 2007. 
6 Note that in van Deventer and Mlambo (2009), criteria with mean rankings of 4 and above were reported as the most 
important criteria and those with mean rankings of 2 and below were reported as the least important criteria. We only report 
the top ten and bottom ten to keep the tables to manageable sizes. 
7 For venture capital firms, a high IRR was ranked at number 21 with a mean rank of 4.02 and a standard deviation of 1.33. 
8 This assertion is also supported by the improved importance attached to the criterion “there will be no follow up investment 
required”, from a mean rank of 2.09 to a mean rank of 2.68. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix Table A1: Additional criteria added by private equity and venture capital Respondents 2010 
Additional Criteria Category Rank Given 
Added by PE Respondents 
The management team provides reports and feedback on performance Management 4 
Ability to think in accordance with deal objectives Management 5 
Willingness to accept appropriate incentive structures Management 5 
Preparedness to take a significant financial risk Management 4 
A proven track record of success in the space Management 5 
Manager/s personally known by us or our network Management 4 
Risk capital in the business Management 5 
Management are properly incentivized Management 5 
The management team is open for discussions and strategy meetings Management 5 
The ability to think strategically and operationally Management 5 
Barriers to entry for competitors Product 4 
Brand, ability to price lead Product 5 
Product distribution network Product 5 
Product barriers to entry Product 5 
Reasonable entry pricing Financial 5 
Investment used for growth capital Financial 5 
Sustainable earnings Financial 5 
Good history of predictable cash generation Financial 5 
History of good profits Financial 5 
Flexible cost structure Financial 4 
Established, stable market Market 5 
Well-developed controls and financial disciplines Other 5 
Added by venture capital Respondents 
Energetic Management 5 
Realistic valuation expectation Management 5 
Financially committed Management 4 
Investment is not highly leveraged Financial 4 
ESG plan in action, Principles and Practices Other 4 
Governance and policy plans/reports Other 4 
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Appendix Table A2: Brief profiles of PE and VC firms that participated in the survey 
Company Fund names Fund Size  
Min 
Investment 
Max 
Investment 
Start-up 
Investment 
Excluded industries 
Aureos Capital 
Aureos Africa Health (2009) US$ 105 million US$ 1 million 
US$ 5 
million 
NO 
Gambling, alcohol 
(excluding beer and wine), 
tobacco, and armaments 
Aureos Africa Fund (2008) US$ 381 million 
US$ 5 million 
US$ 38 
million (10% 
of fund) 
Aureos Southern Africa Fund 
(2003) US$ 50 million 
Capitalworks Investment 
Partners (Pty) Ltd Capitalworks Private Equity I R1,5 billion R70 million R450 million NO Oil and gas exploration 
Capricorn Capital 
Partners (Pty) Ltd 
Capricorn Capital Partners R600 million R10 million R150 million NO Mining 
Coast2Coast 
Investments 
Coast2Coast R350 million 
R30 million 
(annual profit 
over R10 
million) 
R300 million NO Niming, Agriculture, 
Technology 
Collins Private Equity 
Holdings P/L Collins Private Equity R150 million Nil R25 million NO None 
Remgro Ltd       
Kingdon Zephyr 
Pan-African Investment 
Partners (PAIP) I  
US$ 123 million 
$ 10 million $50 million NO Defense, liquor, tobacco 
and gambling 
PAIP II  US$ 200 million 
Lereko Metier Capital 
Growth Fund Managers 
(Pty) Ltd 
Lereko Metier Capital Growth 
Fund R3,5 billion R50 million R750 million NO Spirits and gambling 
RMB Corvest RMB Corvest 
Open ended 
R4,44 billion 
(R2,19 billion in 
BEE deals) 
R10 million R500 million NO Mining, agriculture and 
property 
Vantage Risk Capital 
Vantage Mezzanine Fund I 
R1 billion (with 
fund manager's 
co- investment) R60 million 
R350 million 
(with co-
investment) 
YES 
Primary agricultural, Low 
margin trading business, 
businesses selling arms, loss 
making operational 
turnaround opportunities, 
Junior mining businesses 
Vantage Captial Mezzanine 
Fund II 
R1,85 billion 
Trinitas Private Equity Trinitas Private Equity Fund R600 million R40 million R150 million NO Direct resources and 
property 
RMB Private Equity 
RMB Private Equity 
Open ended R5,2 
billion - - 
NO 
                                          -    
RMB Ventures 
Open ended (in 
excess of R1 
billion invested) 
R50 million R750 million 
Mining, agriculture and 
property 
Nedbank Capital Private 
Equity 
Nedbank Capital Private 
Equity R1,2 billion R30 million R120 million NO 
Real estate, primary 
agriculture 
Actis 
Actis Africa Fund 1 US$ 396 million 
US$ 50 million US$ 200 / 
250 million 
NO Military and gambling 
Actis Africa Fund 2 and 
Canada Investment Fund for 
Africa (CIFA) 
US$ 566 million 
Actis Africa Fund 3 US$ 910 million 
Actis Africa Empowerment 
Fund 
US$ 50 million 
across Africa 
Acorn Private Equity 
Acorn General Fund One 
R60 million (first 
close) R 5 million R 50 million NO 
Property and mining 
General Private Equity (LLP) R51 million 
Acorn Venture Technology 
Fund 
R 18 million (first 
close) No Limit No Limit YES 
Technology (LLP) R 9 million 
Standard Bank Private 
Equity (SBPE) 
Private Equity captive fund More than US$ 1 
billion 
US$ 10 million US$50 
million 
NO Financial services, real 
estate resources 
Glenhove Fund 
Managers 
Women Private Equity Fund1 
(WPEF) 
R128 million R 5 million 
Not more 
than 15% of 
committed 
capital in one 
investment 
NO 
Mining, real estate and 
gambling 
The Fund is fully invested and is closed to new investment opportunities.  
Vertical Capital Partners   Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed 
Biotech Venture 
Partners 
Bioventures 
Biotechnology and Life 
sciences venture capital 
R 76 million R 2 million R 12 million Yes All except biotechnology and life sciences 
Bioventures Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed 
Cape Venture Partners Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed Undisclosed 
Invenfin Invenfin Fund I Undisclosed None None Yes 
Property, gambling, 
franchise, licensee 
Hasso Plattner Ventures 
Africa 
Hasso Plattner 
Ventures Africa Fund 
R 380 million R 5 million R 35 million Yes Property, Mining and 
agriculture 
PoweredbyVC (Pty) Ltd HBD Venture Capital R 138 million R 10 million R 25 million Yes 
Agriculture, armaments, 
alcohol, financial services, 
gambling, insurance, 
mining, real estate, tobacco 
as well as morally 
objectionable industries  
Mecene Investment Mecene Investment Company US$ 50 million US$ 500 000 US$ 5 
million 
Yes Non - financial services 
Treacle Treacle Fund II R 463 million R 10 million R 92 million Yes Primary agriculture, real estate and resources 
Source: Profile information compiled from the SAVCA Matrix Reports 2005-2012 and company websites 
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Appendix Table A3: PE responses to open-ended questions with respective to the financial crisis 
 
Question 1: With reference to any of the above categories or criteria, 
please describe any general changes that have taken place in the private 
equity industry over the last few years. In particular these should refer to 
changes pertaining to the recent financial crisis. 
Question 2: With reference to any of the above 
categories or criteria, please describe any changes that 
have taken place in your firm over the last few years. 
In particular these should refer to changes pertaining 
to the recent financial crisis. 
Question 3: In your personal view what are the major 
challenges facing the industry that have emerged from the 
financial crisis? 
1 
1. Good leadership and experienced management teams were able to come 
through the downturns a lot better. Therefore the importance of management 
quality has increased.  
2. Companies and Investments are not seeking the same amount of leverage as 
before. LBO type deals have dried up. 
1. More interaction with portfolio company management.  
2. Lower security of potential investments 
1. Finding the investment that has the potential for growth in 
their industry and that has the right structures in place to be a 
market leader.  
2. Confidence in alternative asset type financing needs to be 
rebuilt and more focus must be put on growing companies as 
opposed to using high levels of gearing in an attempt to gain 
returns through financial structuring as opposed to tangible 
growth.  
2 
PE has moved more towards the fundamentals on which it developed as an 
asset class with a greater trend towards growth investment as opposed to the 
buyout model. The ability to successfully partner management teams and add 
value beyond the capital invested has become more relevant. 
No change – [firm] established 2006 
Obviously the ability to pursue highly leveraged transactions has 
been affected. In addition, many potential investors have lowered 
their alternative asset allocations. The industry has been classed 
with a bad name as a result of some of the highly leveraged 
transactions that took place immediately prior to the crisis – this 
does result in opportunity however. 
3 
 
Focus on cyclicality. Focus on defensive sectors 
Obviously high IRRs with less leverage. Difficulty in raising 
funds 
4 
A lot more opportunities have arisen in all sectors due to the down turn in the 
economy, allowing Private equity to buy up more market share in varying 
sectors. 
There are a lot more opportunities to invest in but 
borrowing from the retail banks has become harder, so 
structuring of deals has become even more important with 
deferred payments, warranties etc. 
The major challenges are lack of debt funding, the competition 
commission and government regulation of more and more 
markets making it harder to get critical mass in any one sector. 
5 
The only impact we have felt from the financial crisis is that debt funding is 
harder to obtain and more expensive, limiting our ability to do heavily 
leveraged deals. 
None Bank funding 
6 
As a minority equity investor that generally does not look to structured finance 
in its transactions, and focussing on Africa, north of South Africa, where very 
little credit is used (in general), the main changes we‟ve seen over the last 3 
years are valuation expectations by vendors. In 2008/2009, these were high 
compared with 2006/2007 years. Often vendors and PE shops couldn‟t get to 
as middle ground due to unrealistic expectations. Also, as pure equity 
provider, we have had access to opportunities that in more upbeat economic 
times would have gone to other funding sources (e.g. institutions/IPOs/debt 
etc.) 
Focussed on building a stronger team that has improved 
portfolio management capacity, as some investments 
require a lot of focus in an economic downturn. Also 
revised the deal and team structure to get significant “eyes 
on a deal” to mitigate risk. 
In Africa, more money chasing the same, or fewer deals, as 
growth metrics can be quite attractive relative to other emerging 
markets that had more credit facilities. E.g. South Africa, Central 
& Easter Europe.  LP‟s also becoming more demanding with 
regard to portfolio management and performance. The financial 
crisis has in some cases highlighted weaknesses in certain firms, 
which were previously hidden behind a bullish market. 
7 
There is general acceptance now that leverage alone should not be sufficient to 
generate private equity returns. The fund manager must add value to the 
business fundamentals and returns should be generated by growth and multiple 
expansion, not just by yield and leverage 
There is an increasing realisation that banks should lend 
and not make risky and/or illiquid proprietary investments. 
This has changed our prospective investor base and our 
competitive landscape 
As private equity is inherently illiquid, how do investors with 
liabilities, member choice or strategy changes justify continued 
investment in the asset class? The flight to liquidity must 
adversely affect long term equity risk taking 
8 
Businesses are funded through more equity then debt than what was 
historically the case. Sustainable earnings are now in question. 
Need to look at different funding structures in comparison 
to the historical high leverage model. 
Cost base of most companies too high for current level of 
activity. Gearing levels need to reduce further. 
9 
Sharp reduction in deals being completed due to increased difficulty in 
arguing a growth model for a business in difficult economic environment 
(rather than due to insufficient "dry powder") 
Increased focus on tight covenant structures 
Achievement of target returns (IRR and X money) after 
significant losses on portfolios. Underperformance of PE funds 
makes future fund-raisings more difficult. 
10 
Deals are fewer due to continued buyer/vendor valuation gap, lower amounts 
of debt available to fund deals, increased equity commitments to make deals a 
reality. 
Reduction in the absolute size of the portfolio as a form of 
risk mitigation. 
A new jerk reaction of regulators with various new regulatory 
proposals up for discussion. 
11 
No different from those changes impacting on the broader financial 
services/investment industries 
As previous As previous 
Not everyone responded to the open-ended questions
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Appendix Table A4: VC responses to open-ended questions with respect to the financial crisis 
 
Question 1: With reference to any of the above categories or criteria, 
please describe any general changes that have taken place in the venture 
capital industry over the last few years. In particular these should refer 
to changes pertaining to the recent financial crisis. 
 
Question 2: With reference to any of the above categories or 
criteria, please describe any changes that have taken place in 
your firm over the last few years. In particular these should 
refer to changes pertaining to the recent financial crisis. 
 
Question 3: In your personal view what are the major 
challenges facing the industry that have emerged from the 
financial crisis? 
1 Less appetite for risk. Greater scepticism of projections and forecasts 
No longer interested in start-ups or early-stage. Businesses must 
have critical mass and sufficient depth of management 
Capital raising difficult, investors have greater need for 
liquidity. Very difficult to forecast in face of uncertainty 
2 
There is no VC to speak of in SA.  Invenfin, with a small fund is the only one.  
HP is ITC only.  IDC is "soft strategic".  Government and TIA is not working 
and crowding out private sector. They need to stop taking equity. 
Going slow None 
3 
There is increased risk averseness thus fewer early-stage deals will be funded. 
We have seen investors default and this has driven away many investors from 
the VC and private equity funds. 
We have gone from managing a VC fund to now managing a 
private equity fund. 
How do you fund start-ups? As most funds move to later-
stages who will fund the early-stage? In particular who will 
fund high tech early-stage as these companies need the hand 
holding that VC provides. The other major challenge is 
finding investors! 
4 
The M&A market and the VC market outside SA has become more restricted 
and therefore offer less opportunities 
No changes were made More difficult exit opportunities 
5 
As the banks and other traditional finance providers became more 
conservative with their lending policies, entrepreneurs turn to alternative 
sources of finance, adding to an influx of VC deal flow. However, the number 
of South African VC transactions, as well as transaction values, decreased 
significantly over the past two years as VCs conserved capital by assisting 
portfolio companies to maintain a low cash burn rate (planning, cost cutting 
etc). It is also more difficult for SA entrepreneurs to obtain seed or start-up 
capital today as VC investors moved up the ladder towards later-stage 
development- and expansion-type deals as a result of the recession. 
More conservative on doing new deals. More focus on steering 
the existing portfolio through the crisis. 
Taking more risks at doing earlier stage deals. 
Not everyone responded to the open-ended questions 
 
 
